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Abstract Demonstrations that the brain can incorporate a
fake limb into our bodily representations when stroked in
synchrony with our unseen real hand [(the rubber hand illu-
sion (RHI)] are now commonplace. Such demonstrations
highlight the dynamic Xexibility of the perceptual body
image, but evidence for comparable RHI-sensitive changes
in the body schema used for action is less common. Recent
evidence from the RHI supports a distinction between
bodily representations for perception (body image) and for
action (body schema) (Kammers et al. in Neuropsychologia
44:2430–2436,  2006). The current study challenges and
extends these Wndings by demonstrating that active syn-
chronous stroking of a brush not only elicits perceptual
embodiment of a fake limb (body image) but also aVects
subsequent reaching error (body schema). Participants were
presented with two moving fake left hands. When only one
was synchronous during active touch, ownership was
claimed for the synchronous hand only and the accuracy of
reaching was consistent with control of the synchronous
hand. When both fake hands were synchronous, ownership
was claimed over both, but only one was controlled. Thus,
it would appear that fake limbs can be incorporated into the
body schema as well as the body image, but while multiple
limbs can be incorporated into the body image, the body
schema can accommodate only one.
Keywords Rubber hand illusion · Body schema · 
Body image · Supernumerary limb illusion · Sensorimotor 
integration
Introduction
The sense that our body belongs to us (self-attribution) and
that we can see, feel and move it is termed body ownership
(Gallagher  2000) while our sense of embodiment is the
experience of existing within the borders of our body (Arzy
et al. 2006). Our senses of ownership and embodiment are
crucial aspects of self-awareness and understanding the
mechanisms through which we construct, maintain and uti-
lise an internal representation of our body has implications
for understanding how we successfully interact with objects
and people in the world. Intuitively it might seem that our
internal bodily representation is a Wxed and durable con-
struct, but numerous lines of research highlight the modiW-
able nature of our senses of ownership, embodiment and
self-awareness. Disorders of body ownership are well docu-
mented in neuropsychology. For example, somatoparaphre-
nia can occur following damage to a variety of right
hemisphere brain structures (including parietal-temporal
regions, the insula and basal ganglia) and causes a sense of
disownership such that patients will often claim that their
limb belongs to another person (see Vallar and Ronchi
2009 for a review). Another disorder with potentially
severe consequences is body integrity identity disorder in
which individuals experience a strong sense that a healthy
limb does not ‘belong’ and desire to have it amputated so
that their physical body matches the body image with
which they identify (First 2005).
Phantom limb syndrome is a particularly interesting dis-
order of body representation reported in up to 80% of
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amputees in which an amputated limb is perceived as still
being present (Ramachandran and Hierstien 1998). How-
ever, phantom limbs do not only occur in amputees. Super-
numerary phantom limb (SPL) disorder (Pseudopolymelia)
is usually associated with right hemisphere cortical damage
and is characterised by the perception of one or more super-
numerary limbs on the contralesional side of the patient’s
body (Halligan et al. 1993, 1995). For example, a patient
reported by Hari et al. (1998) experienced an additional left
arm that appeared to be in the previous position of her real
left arm during movement. It has been suggested that this
phenomenon may be due to a mismatch between eVerent
and proprioceptive signals, causing a moving limb to be
perceived in two places (Giummarra et al. 2008). This dis-
order raises the possibility that two representations of the
same limb can occur simultaneously.
Whilst serious malfunctions in body representation can
have a detrimental eVect on the way we experience our
body, the transitory nature of our senses of body ownership
and embodiment may hold some survival value. Indeed, in
virtue of the succession of physical changes, the human
body experiences throughout a lifetime of development,
ageing and physical injury, the maintenance of a rigid and
concrete bodily representation would not be useful. A
degree of Xexibility also facilitates the extension of our
internal bodily representation further than the physical bor-
ders of the body enabling the temporary incorporation of
external objects (e.g. tools) into the body schema in order to
attain goals. Iriki et al. (1996) discovered bimodal neurons
in the postcentral gyrus of monkeys that are activated both
in response to peripersonal somatosensory and visual hand-
based stimuli and in response to stimuli near the end of a
rake when it was used as a tool to retrieve food, thus indi-
cating that the tool became represented as an extension of
the hand. Prostheses worn by amputees can be thought of as
tools that extend the existing limb. Indeed research sug-
gests that wearing a prosthesis alters amputees’ internal
representations of the amputated limb as they tend to over-
estimate the length of the remaining part of the limb
(McDonnel et al. 1989). Amputees experiencing phantom
limbs often report that the phantom limb is perceived to
embody the prosthesis (Melzack 1990), thus suggesting that
the prosthesis has been incorporated in the subject’s inter-
nal bodily representation.
The Xexibility of body ownership has been investigated
experimentally in healthy subjects through the illusory
embodiment of a rubber limb. In the Rubber Hand Illusion
(RHI), subjects watch a paintbrush stroking a rubber hand
whilst simultaneously feeling a paintbrush stoking their own
hand, which is hidden from sight. When tactile stimulation
of the rubber hand and real hand are synchronous subjects
report experiencing a sense of ownership of the rubber hand,
and a remapping of the perceived location of the real hand
towards the rubber hand location occurs (Botvinik and
Cohen  1998). Subjective reports of ownership have been
supported by the observation that threatening or contorting
the embodied rubber hand elicits increased activity in corti-
cal areas associated with anxiety i.e. the left insula and ante-
rior cingulate gyrus (Ehrsson et al. 2007) and increased skin
conductance (Armel and Ramachandran 2003).
The RHI provides an opportunity to explore the basis of
ownership in healthy controls and indicates that ownership
may be based on the convergence of multi-sensory inputs.
To resolve the multi-sensory conXict created by seeing the
tactile stimulation in one location and feeling it in another;
visual and tactile inputs are matched. The visual capture of
touch results in a uniWed multi-sensory event experienced
in the location of the rubber hand (Makin et al. 2008; Botvi-
nik and Cohen 1998). The notion that ownership in the RHI
is related to the integration of multi-sensory inputs is sup-
ported by the observation that activity in the premotor cor-
tex occurs at the illusion onset and is correlated with the
strength of the sense of ownership of the rubber hand (Ehrs-
son et al. 2004,  2005) as parietal regions that integrate
visual, tactile and proprioceptive information send informa-
tion to the premotor cortex (Graziano and Botvinik 2001).
Armel and Ramachandran (2003) argue that a bottom-up
Bayesian process of multi-sensory matching is both suY-
cient and necessary for the RHI to occur, regardless of top-
down knowledge about the plausibility of ownership of the
object in question. Indeed, they found that as long as tactile
stimulation of both the rubber hand and the unseen real
hand were synchronous the RHI occurred despite discrep-
ancies in hand size and skin tone, when the rubber arm was
placed in anatomically implausible locations and even
when the rubber hand was extended by up to 3 feet. Most
surprising is that when subjects viewed a tabletop being
synchronously stroked with the real unseen hand, they
reported feeling as though the tactile sensations were aris-
ing from the table, particularly when stimulation was
applied to a common texture such as a plaster. These results
have not been well replicated, however, and subsequent
research suggests that the RHI can be prevented when the
rubber hand is rotated by 180° (Ehrsson et al. 2004; Tsak-
iris and Haggard 2005) or when it is replaced with a piece
of wood or an incongruent hand (i.e. a right hand, when the
left had been stimulated) (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005).
Constantini and Haggard (2007) found that the eVects of
matching visual and tactile stimulation on the sense of own-
ership in the RHI occurred only after the matching of cur-
rent visual and proprioceptive states. This indicates that
whilst a bottom-up process of matching of sensory inputs
may be necessary to elicit the RHI, it is not suYcient as the
illusion is also dependent on a top-down process of match-
ing the rubber hand with pre-existing internal representa-
tions of the body (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005).Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395 387
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A distinction has commonly been made between two
types of internal bodily representation: ‘body image’ for
perception and ‘body Schema’ for action (Paillard 1991,
1999). The body schema is a dynamic representation of the
body constructed primarily from bottom-up sensory input
necessary for action and postural conWguration, such as
proprioceptive information from the muscles, joints and
skin (Gallagher 1986; Paillard 1999; Kammers et al. 2006).
Body image, however, is an internal mental representation
of properties of the body such as its form and external
appearance based on higher order top-down factors such as
a person’s perceptual experience, conceptual understanding
of their body, and emotional attitude towards it (Gallagher
and Cole 1995). This distinction is highlighted by disorders
in which disruption of one speciWc representation occurs.
For example, hemispatial neglect is as disorder occurring
after damage to the posterior right hemisphere in which
patients sometimes act as though the entire contralesional
side of space and their body does not exist. The ability to
make automatic movements with the contralesional limb
tends to be unimpaired indicating a disorder of body image,
not body schema (Gallagher 2005). Conversely, Buxbaum
et al. (2000) present evidence for an impaired body schema
in a patient with apraxia.
The way in which multi-sensory conXict in the RHI is
resolved may depend on which particular representation is
disrupted. Kammers et al. (2009) asked participants to indi-
cate the position of their real unseen hand using both per-
ceptual judgements and motor judgements (i.e. a fast
ballistic pointing movement with either the stimulated or
non-stimulated hand to the other hand), with perceptual
responses and reaching thought to be based predominantly
on body image and body schema respectively (Kammers
et al. 2006). Only perceptual judgements, and not reaching
movements, were sensitive to the RHI indicating a distor-
tion in the underlying body image, but not body schema.
This result is notably diVerent from that found by Botvinik
and Cohen (1998) for whom intermanual reaches reXected
the perceptual bias of the RHI. However, in that study, par-
ticipants were required to draw their Wnger under the table
until it was judged to be in alignment with the index Wnger
of the other hand. Thus, rather than make an action
response as in the Kammers et al. (2009) and current exper-
iments, participants were eVectively asked to use their
Wnger as an indicator in a perceptual judgement task.
Unlike ballistic goal-directed reaching movements, this
form of judgement may be subject to the same perceptual
biases as making verbal or visual perceptual judgements.
Kammers et al. (2009) suggest that the visual capture of
proprioception in the RHI only occurs for perceptual
responses as proprioception is weighted more heavily than
vision in the body schema for action, than the body image
used for perceptual judgements. However, one of the draw-
backs of traditional RHI studies is that they are based on an
illusory representation of a static rubber hand, which, due
to its static nature, may prevent incorporation into the body
schema and when subjects are asked to make a motor
response they may revert to a representation of their real
dynamic hand.
The current study used spatially coincident computer-
manipulated video feedback that allowed participants to
view a live dynamic video image of their own hand in the
same location as their real unseen hand. The image could
be manipulated so that participants viewed two virtual
supernumerary left hands (SNLs), both visually identical to
the real left hand, but oVset to the left and right of the posi-
tion of the real (unseen) hand. Subjects were not informed
as to which (if either) was in the same location as their
actual hand. The dynamic nature of the video image meant
that, unlike previous RHI research (Botvinik and Cohen
1998; Kammers et al. 2009) in which a static rubber limb
was used, the to-be-embodied limb was dynamic and could
be controlled by the participant potentially facilitating its
incorporation into the action-based body schema. Addition-
ally, whilst the classic RHI is usually limited to vision and
passive touch, the current set-up allowed for the investiga-
tion of whether congruency between active touch and
vision is suYcient to elicit a sense of ownership over a spa-
tially oVset representation of the limb. A previous study by
Tsakiris et al. (2006) demonstrated that by using synchro-
nous active movement for the RHI the perceptual shift of
the real position of the limb was more complete, incorpo-
rating multiple digits, whereas using passive movement
(participant’s Wnger moved passively by the experimenter)
or passive touch (static hand stroked by a paintbrush) lead
to more localised perceptual shifts that were conWned to the
stimulated Wnger. The suggestion was that action, and so
the body schema, inXuences perceptual body awareness
(body image/ownership)—with ownership in this case
being inferred from an indication of proprioceptive drift.
The current study takes this a step further by using direct
low and high-level measurements of ownership to investi-
gate whether synchronous active stroking can inform low-
level motor responses (body schema) as well as high-level
perceptual judgements of ownership (body image).
In the current study, participants carried out an active
touch task in which they were required to stroke a tooth-
brush with their left index Wnger. Two representations of
the left hand were viewed simultaneously and the visual
feedback was manipulated across three conditions. In the
‘Left Synchronous’ (LS) condition, the hand on the left was
viewed as stroking the brush synchronously with tactile
stimulation of the real hand, whereas a half second visual
delay was applied the hand on the right. In the ‘Right
Synchronous’ (RS) condition, the hand on the right was
viewed stroking the brush synchronously with the tactile388 Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395
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stimulation of the real hand, whereas a half second delay
was applied to the hand on the left. In the ‘Both Synchro-
nous’ condition (BS), both hands were viewed as stoking
the brush synchronously with the tactile stimulation of the
real unseen hand. This manipulation allowed the explora-
tion of whether, when two competing representations of the
same limb are viewed, the one for which seen and felt touch
are synchronous will be incorporated into body representa-
tions and, in addition, whether synchronous seen and felt
touch of both limbs results in both being incorporated into
body representations. Indeed, disorders such as SPL disor-
der suggest that it is possible to have two simultaneous rep-
resentations of the same limb and a recent study by Ehrsson
et al. (2009), in which two rubber limbs were presented
either side of the unseen real hand, found that stroking the
real hand and both rubber limbs synchronously with a
paintbrush increased skin conductance to noxious stimuli
applied to both fake limbs.
In the current study, the extent of the illusion in each
condition was measured using a questionnaire and motor
task to indicate whether either (or both) of the limbs had
been incorporated into the body image, and body schema
respectively (Kammers et al. 2006,  2009). The question-
naire was an adapted version of that used by Botvinik and
Cohen (1998) designed to measure the subjective sense of
ownership of each of the hands and provide a more thor-
ough exploration of the subjective reported sense of owner-
ship of two limbs observed by Ehrsson (2009).
Based on previous research indicating that both congru-
ent vision and passive touch (Botvinik and Cohen 1998;
Tsakiris and Haggard 2005) and congruent vision and
active movement (Tsakiris et al. 2006) elicit the RHI, sub-
jects should experience a stronger sense of ownership for a
limb when seen and felt touch is synchronous rather than
asynchronous i.e. a stronger sense of ownership of the left
hand should be reported in the LS than in the RS condition
and a stronger sense of ownership of the right hand should
reported in the RS than in the LS condition. This was exam-
ined using planned comparisons conducted between owner-
ship scores for both the left and right SNL in the LS and RS
conditions. It was also predicted that synchronously strok-
ing both images of the hand would cause both SNLs to be
incorporated into the body image so that a stronger sense of
ownership of both hands should be reported in the BS con-
dition than either the LS or RS condition. Planned compari-
sons between ownership scores given in response to
questions explicitly regarding both SNLs were used to
directly test these predictions.
In the motor task participants were required to make an
open-loop pointing movement towards a target positioned
directly ahead of their real unseen hand, and spaced equally
between the two seen hands. If the hand on the left is incor-
porated into the body schema (predicted to occur in the LS
condition due to synchronous stroking of the left hand) then
the handpath of the pointing movement of the real hand
should err to the right of the target, whereas if the hand on
the right is incorporated into the body schema (predicted to
occur in the RS condition due to synchronous stroking of
the right hand) then the handpath should err to the left of
the target (Fig. 1a), therefore, planned comparisons
between end point reaching error in the LS and RS condi-
tions and baseline reaches were conducted.
For the BS condition, an additional pointing task was
added in which distractor items were presented either side
of the target. If both hands were incorporated into the body
schema then reaching directly to the target location with
one SNL would drive the other SNL through the distractor.
Thus, if both left hands are part of the body schema a diVer-
ent handpath must be calculated (compared to the no dis-
tractor condition) in order to ensure both hands avoid the
distractor items (Fig. 1b). Even though the distractor
objects were visual images and as such provided no real
obstruction to hand movement, alterations to the handpaths
should still be observed as participants have been found to
alter their handpaths in the presence of non-target LEDs
even if they are not physical obstacles to (Tipper et al.
1997). A further planned comparison between mid-point
error in the distractor and no-distractor tasks was conducted
to directly test this prediction.
Method
Participants
Twelve University of Nottingham undergraduate volun-
teers (1 Male) with an age range of 19–22 years partici-
pated in the study. All participants were right-handed and
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave
informed consent.
Apparatus
Participants viewed real-time video images of their left
hand and arm from the same perspective as if viewing the
actual hand using a MIRAGE system (Newport et al.
2009): Participants sat at a table and looked into a mirror
suspended horizontally above the work surface. A com-
puter monitor was suspended equidistant above the mirror
facing downwards. Live video images of the participant’s
moving hand beneath the mirror (delay < 17 ms) were cap-
tured and displayed via the monitor and mirror. The loca-
tion and angles of the camera, monitor and mirror were
such that viewed real time images of the participant’s limb
appeared in the same spatial location and from the same
perspective as if viewing the limb directly (Fig. 2).Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395 389
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Captured images could be displayed veridically, or manipu-
lated by in-house software. Image manipulation involved
duplicating and overlaying images of the hand with a lateral
shift to the left and right as required. When duplicate
images of the left hand were displayed the left image (left
SNL) was shifted leftwards and the right image rightwards
(right SNL) of the real hand such that the index Wnger of the
left SNL was 6 cm to the left of the real index Wnger and the
index  Wnger of the right SNL was 6 cm to the right of
the real index Wnger. All measurements were taken from
the centre of the index Wnger nail tip. Thus the two images
were equidistant from the location of the real hand (which
could not be seen) and did not overlap. A temporal delay
could be applied to either hand image independently. Ques-
tionnaire items were also displayed via MIRAGE so that
participants were not required to move for this part of the
experiment. A 5 mm infra-red reXective marker was
attached to the nail of the index Wnger so that spatial hand-
paths could be recorded. A black fabric bib ensured that
participants were unable to see any portion of their real
limb.
Procedure
Upon being seated at the apparatus participants were given a
brief acclimatisation period (10 seconds) during which they
viewed an un-manipulated image their left hand moving
freely under the screen (i.e. in real-time and in its real loca-
tion) in order that they could become accustomed to the
experimental set-up. The right hand was kept on the partici-
pant’s lap, and the index Wnger of the left hand was placed on
an unseen tactile start point, where it remained between tasks.
In all subsequent conditions participants stroked the bris-
tles of a toothbrush at 1 Hz for 20 s with their left index
Fig. 1 a Real and SNL hand-
paths expected if the left, right, 
or actual limb is controlled in the 
pointing task. b Expected hand-
paths in the BS distractor condi-
tion pointing to the target with 
the left hand if both hands are 
incorporated into the body sche-
ma, demonstrating distractor 
avoidance behaviour for the 
right hand, and if only the left 
hand is incorporated into the 
body schema, driving the right 
hand through the distractor390 Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395
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Wnger while viewing one or two images of their left hand.
In the baseline condition only one image of the left hand
was shown in the same location as the real hand. In the
experimental conditions two images of the moving left
hand were shown and a 0.5 second temporal delay was
applied to the left SNL, the right SNL or neither SNL so
that the stroking was synchronous for the right (RS condi-
tion), left (LS) or both (BS) SNLs respectively. Participants
were informed that they would be shown an extra hand but
were given no information as to which (if any) corre-
sponded to the position of their real hand. For each condi-
tion participants performed two 20 s sessions of stroking,
verbally responded to questionnaire items (taking approxi-
mately two minutes) and pointed three times to a visual tar-
get with their left hand (but without vision of the hand or
any image of the hand). The order of the pointing and ques-
tionnaire tasks was counterbalanced between participants with
a separate period of stroking performed prior to each task.
For the pointing task participants made open-loop
reaches towards a visual target three times. The target was
displayed as a white circle against a black background, pre-
sented 10 cm directly in front of the index Wnger. In an
additional pointing with distractors task (presented in the
BS condition only) red boxes were presented 3 cm to either
side of the target. The distance between each distractor and
the start point was 5 cm. At the end of each reach all partic-
ipants were able to successfully return to the tactile start
point. For all pointing conditions the hand (real or other-
wise) was not visible at any point.
Two questionnaires were presented on-screen. Question-
naire A was presented after the baseline active touch task in
which a single un-manipulated image of the real left hand
was viewed stroking the brush for 20 s. Questionnaire A
included 6 questions related to participants’ experience of
their hand as viewed through the screen and was included
primarily to conWrm that participants felt a sense of owner-
ship over a video-image of their hand when in its true loca-
tion. Questionnaire B, presented after active touch in all the
other conditions, included 14 questions regarding the sub-
ject’s experience of their limb ownership in each of the
three conditions (LS, RS, BS), with the aim of establishing
which of the seen limbs were incorporated into the partici-
pant’s body image. The questions were based on those used
by Botvinik and Cohen (1998) so that the results would be
comparable with previous RHI experiments. Questionnaire
B was presented 3 times, once for each condition, and par-
ticipants verbally responded according to a 7 point rating
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The ques-
tionnaire items were presented on-screen in a random order
and the participants gave verbal responses so that the hand
could not be viewed and was not required to move.
Results
Questionnaire responses
Questionnaire A: The results of Questionnaire A demon-
strate that the image elicited a strong sense of ownership.
After only 20 seconds stimulation participants were able to
treat the video image of their left hand as if it were there
actual left hand, showing strong agreement with the state-
ments “it seemed like the image of the hand was my hand”
(median = 6), and “it seemed like the image of the hand
belonged to me” (median = 6).
Questionnaire B: Questionnaire B items revealed that
when one SNL was subjected to a temporal delay (asyn-
chronous), participants felt that the synchronous hand was
touching the brush, that it belonged to them and was part of
their body. When both (left) hands stroked synchronously,
participants felt that both left hands belonged to them and
that both were part of their body (Fig. 3a). In order to com-
pare the sense of ownership for each hand in each condition
statistically in each condition scores from the items ‘It
seemed like the left/right/both hands belonged to me’ and
‘It seemed like the left/right/both hand was part of my
body’ related to this experience were collapsed such that a
measure of ownership of the LEFT, RIGHT and BOTH
hands was computed for each condition (LS, RS, LS).
(Fig. 3b).
A 2 £ 3 repeated measures ANOVA was carried out on
this data with the factors Sense of Ownership (Left, Right,
Both) and Hand Synchronicity (LS, RS, BS). A signiWcant
main eVect of Sense of Ownership was found
(F(2,22) = 8.511, p < 0.05), as was a signiWcant main eVect
of Hand Synchronicity (F(2,22) = 9.649,  p < 0.05) and a
signiWcant interaction (F(4,44) = 38.811, p <0 . 0 0 1 ) .
Fig. 2 a Schematic representation of the MIRAGE system. The
angles of the camera and mirrors enable real-time video capture of the
participants actual limb to be presented in the same spatial position and
same visual perspective as if viewing the limb directlyExp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395 391
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Planned comparisons revealed that the mean owner-
ship of the left hand was signiWcantly greater in the LS
condition than in the RS condition (F(1,22) = 71.845,
p < 0.0001); ownership of the right hand was signiW-
cantly greater in the RS condition than the LS condition
(F(1,22) = 64.574,  p < 0.0001) and ownership of both
hands was greater in the BS condition than either the RS
(F(1,22) = 32.766, p < 0.0001) or LS (F(1,22) = 29.094,
p < 0.0001) conditions.
Pointing data
End-point and Midpoint error (in degrees) was calculated
for each experimental condition (BS, LS and RS) and the
baseline condition. End-point error was calculated as the
angle between a straight line from the start point to the tar-
get and from the start point to end-point of the movement.
The same procedure was used for midpoint calculation,
except that mid-point hand location (as the hand passed the
distractor) was used instead of end-point location. Due to a
recording error the pointing data were lost for one partici-
pant in the LS condition. As a consequence their data were
omitted from all reaching planned comparisons.
The mean baseline end-point error (0.13°, SD 6.51) was
compared to the mean end-point error for each of the three
conditions (RS, LS and BS) using a-priori pairwise com-
parisons. A rightward mean end-point error was observed
in the LS condition (mean = 11.44°, SD = 11.37) which
was signiWcantly more rightward than the mean baseline
endpoint error (F(1,40) = 17.630, p = 0.0001). A leftward
mean end-point error was observed in the RS condition
(mean = ¡21.53°, SD = 6.09) and was signiWcantly more
leftward than the mean baseline endpoint error (F = (1,40)
54.152,  p = 0.0001). Finally, a leftward mean end-point
error was found in the BS condition (mean = ¡16.08°,
SD = 12.45) and was signiWcantly more leftward than the
baseline mean end-point error (F(1,40) = 31.668
p = 0.0001). A priori pairwise comparisons revealed that
there was no signiWcant diVerence between the mean mid-
point error in the distractor (mean = 22.32, SD = 11.38),
Fig. 3 a Questionnaire scores. Medians and IQRs after synchronous
stroking by the left (left), right (middle) and both (right) SNLs. b Sense
of ownership ratings over the left (light grey), right (dark grey) and
both (open) hands when the synchronously stroked hand was either the
left (LS), right (RS) or both hands (BS). Note that ownership was
claimed over both hands only when both hands were synchronous.
Error bars show standard error. c Typical handpaths during open-loop
reaching. Left handpaths of the unseen real hand (indicated by faint
central index Wnger) following synchronous stroking by the left and
right SNL. Mean end-point errors were signiWcantly diVerent to base-
line reaches. The hand images represent the locations of the left and
right SNLs during stroking (not visible during reaching). Right hand-
paths following simultaneous synchronous stroking by both SNLs with
and without distractors (open squares). Distractors made no diVerence
to endpoint errors or mid-path deviations392 Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395
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and no distractor task (mean = 22.32, SD = 9.27) in the BS
condition (F = 0.659 (1, 40), p = 0.4216) indicating that
participants did not take distractor avoidance into account
when executing their reaches (Fig. 3c for example hand-
paths). For the purposes of comparison, a deviation of
11.44° (recorded for the LS condition) equates to a right-
ward deviation of 2 cm at the target distance, suggesting
that for the action response the encoded position of the real
limb had been shifted 2 cm towards the position of the left
(synchronous) SNL. For the RS condition, an error of
¡21.53° corresponds to a rightward deviation of 3.9 cm
suggesting that the position of the real limb had been
shifted »4 cm towards the position of the right (synchro-
nous) SNL and an endpoint error of ¡16.08° (BS condi-
tion) would be equivalent to a lateral shift of 2.9 cm
towards the right SNL. As can be seen from Fig. 4, the
observed pattern of results was very similar for all
participants with high ownership ratings for the left hand
resulting in rightward reaches and high ownership ratings
for the right hand resulting in leftward reaches.
Discussion
Through the use of computer-manipulated real-time visual
feedback subjects were exposed to two visual representations
of their left hand, both visually identical to the real hand but
oVset to either side of the real hand location. Visual feedback
of active touch was manipulated such that seen and felt touch
was either synchronous for the left hand only, the right hand
only or both hands. Questionnaire items related to ownership
of the hand demonstrated that when only one hand was seen
and felt to be synchronous there was a sense of ownership
over that hand, but not the asynchronous hand. When both
left hands stroked simultaneously and synchronously a sense
of ownership was claimed over both hands.
Fig. 4 The relationship between reach accuracy and ownership rat-
ings for all participants following left and right synchronous stroking
for the questions ‘it seemed as though the hand on the left belonged to
me’ (top left), ‘it seemed as though the hand on the right belonged to
me’ (top right), ‘it seemed like the hand on the left was part of my
body’ (bottom left) and ‘it seemed like the hand on the right was part
of my body’ (bottom right). Low ownership ratings for the left SNL
reliably produced leftward (¡ve) errors consistent with control of the
right SNL while high left SNL ownership ratings produced responses
consistent with control of the left SNL (two leftmost panels). Low
ownership ratings for the right SNL, on the other hand, produced right-
ward (+ve) errors consistent with control of the left SNL and high own-
ership ratings for the right SNL produced leftward (¡ve) reaches
consistent with control of the right SNL (two rightmost panels)Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395 393
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As predicted, the questionnaire data indicated that syn-
chronous active touch and vision can elicit a sense of own-
ership of an oVset video image of a limb: a stronger sense
of ownership being experienced for the limb for which seen
and felt touch were synchronous, than the limb for which it
was asynchronous. This Wnding is in agreement with previ-
ous research, which has demonstrated that illusory owner-
ship of both a rubber limb (Botvinik and Cohen, 1998) and
a virtual limb (Slater et al. 2008) can be elicited by syn-
chronous passive touch and vision. Additionally active
movement and visual feedback of the movement has been
found to elicit a shift in perceived hand position towards a
video image of a hand (Tsakiris et al. 2006). The current
study corroborates and extends these Wndings and is the
Wrst to explore direct competition between simultaneously
presented synchronous and asynchronous limbs in addition
to presenting two synchronous stroking hands.
Ownership of the rubber hand in the RHI can be
explained by a process of visual, tactile and proprioceptive
matching (Botvinik and Cohen, 1998). In the current study
active touch was felt in the location of the real hand, but
seen in the location of the synchronously stroked oVset
limb. Visual and tactile inputs were matched and, due to the
greater weighting of visual information, a uniWed multi-
sensory event was experienced in the location of the syn-
chronously stroking seen hand.
The questionnaire results indicate that when both limbs
stroked the brush synchronously with the real unseen hand
a strong sense of ownership of both occurred. When asked
directly about feelings of ownership over both of the left
hands (“it seemed like both (left) hands were part of my
body”, “it seemed like both (left) hands belonged to me”) a
signiWcantly greater sense of ownership was reported when
both hands were synchronous (BS condition) compared to
when only the left (LS condition) or right (RS condition)
was synchronous. This Wnding is consistent with recent
research by Ehrsson (2009) in which two rubber hands
were synchronously stroked with the real unseen hand, elic-
iting an increased skin conductance response when either
limb was injured and indicates that integration of visual and
tactile inputs may be suYcient to elicit the incorporation of
two representations of the same limb into the subjects body
image.
The use of both a questionnaire and a motor response
measure allowed investigation of whether each limb had
been embodied into the body image, and body schema
(Kammers et al. 2006, 2009) based on the distinction that
has been made between body schema as a representation of
the body based on bottom-up sensory input necessary for
action, and body image as a top-down representation for
perception (Paillard 1991,  1999). The pointing task
required participants to point towards a target without
vision of either hand. In the LS condition a rightward
end-point error was observed which was signiWcantly
greater than the baseline error. This indicated that the hand
on the left had been incorporated into the subjects’ body
schema, as the subjects had attempted to point to the target
using the hand located on the left. Conversely, in the RS
condition a leftwards end-point error was observed that was
signiWcantly greater than the baseline error. This indicated
that the hand on the right had been incorporated into the
subjects’ body schema as the subjects had attempted to
point to the target using the hand located on the right.
As predicted, the results indicated that when two oVset
representations of the same limb were viewed, the one for
which touch and vision were congruent was incorporated
into the body schema. As in the classic RHI (Botvinik and
Cohen 1998), it seems that a proprioceptive re-mapping of
the perceived location of the real hand took place towards
the location of the seen touch. The signiWcant error demon-
strated in the RS and LS conditions has implications for our
understanding of the extent of the RHI. Kammers et al.
(2009) reported that perceptual judgements about limb
ownership, but not action movements were sensitive to dis-
tortion in the RHI and argued that this demonstrated that
visual capture of touch only occurs for the body image (for
perceptual judgements) and that the body schema (for
action) resists the illusion due to proprioception being
weighted more heavily than vision. In the current experi-
ment, however, when an oVset representation of the left
hand was seen to stroke a paintbrush synchronously with
the unseen real left hand, the perceived real hand location
was indeed remapped towards the location of the oVset
limb, as revealed by pointing errors consistent with a
remapped limb position. In Kammers et al.’s (2009) study,
however, the resistance of the RHI to action may have been
an artefact of the task which required subjects to incorpo-
rate a static fake limb into their body schema. Whilst sub-
jects may have answered perceptual questions related to the
ownership of the rubber limb, when asked to make a motor
response they may have reverted to a representation of their
real dynamic limb. It is not currently known whether the
representation of the fake limb replaces, or exists in parallel
to, the representation of the real limb. The dynamic nature
of the visual representation of the limb used in the current
study may have facilitated its incorporation into an action-
based body schema, allowing the body schema to be
updated in a way that is not possible with static limbs, how-
ever life-like in appearance.
Although participants claimed a sense of ownership over
two limbs, no diVerences in handpath were observed
between the distractor and no distractor task in the BS con-
dition. This suggests that while both limbs could be incor-
porated into the body image, they were not simultaneously
incorporated into the body schema. Participants were
apparently happy to allow one of the representations of394 Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395
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their hand to pass through a visual distractor. Whilst this
result indicates that both SNL’s were not simultaneously
incorporated into the body schema, a signiWcant leftward
end-point error was observed in the BS pointing task. This
suggests that when both limbs synchronously stroked the
toothbrush, and were in direct competition for assimilation
into the body schema, it was the hand on the right that was
incorporated into the body schema, rather than the left, and
this was the case for all but one participant.
The conclusion that two supernumerary limbs can be
assimilated into the body image, but that only one can be
incorporated into the body schema must be tempered with
the following caveat: while two limbs could be embodied if
both moved synchronously, participants may have felt that
pointing with two hands was an impossible task and there-
fore chose to control only the one that they felt most owner-
ship for, treating as irrelevant the perceived (but unseen)
handpath of the other hand. Having said that, although the
two hands were yoked in reality by the duplication of the
video image, participants never saw them move together in
a yoked fashion and the index Wngers had already been seen
to operate independently so it is also possible that partici-
pants were under the impression that they could move them
in independent directions such that both avoided the dis-
tractor. Nonetheless, even if participants made a conscious,
or unconscious, decision to only control one hand, the vast
majority of them chose the one on the right.
It is interesting to note that a bias was apparent through-
out the experiment for the right SNL for both perceptual
ownership and reaching control. In the RS condition, par-
ticipants made reaching movements as though the location
of their hand was shifted »4 cm towards the location of the
right SNL. This is a considerable shift following only 20 s
of synchronous stimulation, given that the right SNL was
located just 6 cm to the right of the real hand. In contrast,
the shift for the LS condition was not so large with reaches
being made as though the real hand were located »2c m
towards the left SNL (i.e. only half the shift of that
observed in the equivalent RS condition). Reaches in the
BS condition were executed as though the actual limb loca-
tion were shifted towards the right SNL, but to a lesser
extent (»3c m  v s .  »4 cm). That is, a synchronously strok-
ing right SNL seemed to be favoured by the body schema
above a synchronously stroking left SNL in all conditions.
Furthermore, when asked about each hand independently in
the BS condition (“it seemed like the right/left hand was
part of my body” etc.), ownership scores were also margin-
ally higher for the right compared to the left SNL suggest-
ing that the right SNL may also be favoured by the body
image when in direct competition.
It is unclear whether the asymmetries observed for the
ownership scores in the BS condition also account for why
it is the right SNL that is controlled during reaching—that
is, top-down processes stemming from greater feelings of
ownership dictate which limb is controlled. There are sev-
eral reasons to suggest that this is not the case. First, if this
were the case then the end-point error observed in the LS
condition should be equivalent to that observed in the RS
condition, as feelings of ownership between the two condi-
tions do not appear to diVer. The magnitude of the error in
the RS condition, however, was twice that in the LS condi-
tion, suggesting some dissociation between the two. In
addition, the single participant who reached rightwards
rather than leftwards in the BS condition counter-intuitively
gave higher ownership ratings for the right hand compared
to the left hand (means = 6, 3, respectively). It might be
speculated that if there case were a general preference for
the right hand in the BS condition, it could be accounted for
by the asymmetry of the distance from the body. The right
SNL was always closer to the body than either the left SNL
or the real hand and it seems plausible that a limb that is
closer to the body (i.e. the right SNL) might more readily
be accepted into the body representations (although owner-
ship scores, measured via questionnaire, do not appear to
support this in the LS and RS conditions). It should also be
noted that proprioceptive drift—a natural drift towards the
body in the perceived position of body parts when occluded
from view (Wann and Ibrahim 1992)—is unlikely to be a
confound. Baseline recording, in which the active touch
task was performed with video feedback of the hand in its
true location, revealed a very small (0.13°) positive error,
suggesting that the drift, if any, took the hand away from
the body rather than towards it. Finally, and at the request
of a reviewer, post hoc t tests were conducted on the ques-
tionnaire ratings in the BS condition. These analyses did
not reveal signiWcant diVerences in ownership between the
right and left SNLs or the right and both SNLs when both
had been stroked synchronously (max. t(11) = 2.57,
p = 0.52 Bonferroni corrected). Even if this had been sig-
niWcant it would merely have indicated that ownership and
control were similarly aVected, not that one was the result
of the other. Whatever the mechanisms involved, the asym-
metric nature of both the questionnaire and pointing data
suggest that probabilistic conscious and unconscious deci-
sions about multiple representations of the limb may not be
treated as equally as Ehrsson (2009) suggests. Indeed,
given the distributed network involved in bodily represen-
tations (Vallar and Ronchi 2009) it is likely that the dissoci-
ation of eVects observed here correspond to separable
underlying neural processes for body image for ownership
and body schema for control.
In summary, after only 20 s of synchronous active stimu-
lation participants incorporated a synchronous fake limb
into both the body image and body schema, as indicated by
the reported sense of ownership and pointing movements.
Participants could also be made to embody multiple fakeExp Brain Res (2010) 204:385–395 395
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limbs into their body image representation. While a point-
ing task did not indicate that both fake representations of
the limb were taken into consideration when planning the
handpath, a subjective sense of ownership for both was
reported. The current study provides insight about the way
the body is experienced and highlights the transitory nature
of body representations that can be so readily modiWed. The
current experimental set-up provides an important means
for testing the extent to which body representation can be
distorted and, as such, may provide an important tool in the
research of disorders of body representation.
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